I. Introduction
Optional Time-of-Use Prices for Electricity by Kenneth Train and Gil Mehrez University of California, Berkeley
Economists have argued for many years that electricity rates that vary by time of day should be implemented in place of non-time-differentiated rates (Houthakker, 1951; Boiteux, 1960; Williamson, 1966) . Under these time-of-use (TOU) rates, prices are higher during the peak time of day, when electricity capacity is strained and marginal costs of production are higher, than in off-peak periods, when marginal costs are lower. By moving prices closer to marginal cost in each time period, economic efficiency is enhanced.
In practice, TOU prices for electricity have nearly always been offered on a voluntary basis, at least in the residential sectorl. That is, instead of replacing non-time-differentiated rates with TOU rates, as economists generally have recommended, regulators have usually approved TOU rates only when they are offered to customers as an option, with each customer able to choose between the non-time-differentiated rates and the TOU rates.
The offering of optional TOU rates has spurred spirited controversy among intervenors in utility ratemaking proceedings and heated debate among researchers. The implications of optional TOU prices for economic efficiency, and, more directly, for the welfare of parties to the ratemaking proceedings, are not the same as those for mandatory TOU prices (Caves et aI, 1987; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Train, 1988 Train, , 1991 In particular, it is possible that the offering of optional TOU rates will decrease the utility's profits. This reduction in profits will either be passed onto shareholders in terms of lower returns or to ratepayers in the form of higher rates. California'S energy utilities are regulated under the Electric Rate Adjustment Mechanism (ERAM), which requires that undercollection of revenues in one period be recouped in future periods; a similar mechanism oerates on the cost side. Consequently, in California, any loss to the utility that the optional TOU rates induce is borne by ratepayers.
Optional TOU rates need not reduce the utility's profits. Depending on customer's demand curves and other factors, the offering of optional TOU rates can increase the utility's profits and lead, under regulatory procedures like those in California, to a general rate reduction. Circumstances under which each of these two outcomes will occur are described in the following I Boiteux (1988) reports that of the seven European countries with TOU electricity rates for residences, six oHer them on an optional basis. Aigner (1988) recounts a similar story for the U.S., where optional TOU electricity rates are becoming fairly widespread while mandatory TOU rates, in the residential sector at least, have been ilpplied neilrly exclusively in experiments of limited coverilge ilnd duration. In the commerciill ilnd industriill sectors, milnd<ltory TOU rates for electricity are more common, though optional ilpplications still outnumber mandatory ones. 1 section.
The issue of whether optional TOU rates increase or decrease utility profits, and hence .lead, under ERAM, to a general rate reduction or increase, is an empirical question. This question serves as the motivation for our analysis. In particular, we examine the optional TOU rates that Pacific Gas and Electric ,Company (PG&E) offered to its residential customers as part of an experiment on TOU pridng conducted in 1985-86. We estimate an econometric model of customers' TOU consumption and their choice between TOU and standard, non-timedifferentiated rates. We use this model to determine whether the optional TOU rates that PG&E offered under this experiment increased or decreased PG&E's profits and hence contributed to a decrease or increase in general rates.
The next section describes, in broad terms, the conditions under which optional TOU rates can be expected to increase or decrease utility profits. Section ill then describes the choice process of customers in deciding between TOU and standard rates; this discussion motivates the specification of the econometric model. Section IV describes PG&E's experiment with optional TOU rates and identifies the data that we use in our analysis. Section V presents the results of our model estimation. In section VI, the estimated model is used to determine whether the optional TOU rates that PG&E offered increased or decreased its profits. Directions for further analysis are enumerated in section VIT. A technical appendix presents the detailed specification of the econometric model and describes the estimation procedure.
ll. The Issue Df Optional TOU Rates
As stated above, the offering of optional TOUrates can, depending on customers' demand curves and other factors, either increase or decrease the utility's profits. Consider first an extreme, but illustrative, example of how the offering of optional TOU rates can reduce a utility's profits. Suppose each customer has a fixed level of demand in each period of day. If optional TOU rates are offered, customers with relatively low peak consumption and relatively high offpeak consumption will choose the TOU rates, since their energy bills will decrease by doing so. Customers with relatively high peak consumption and low off-peak consumption will choose to remain on the standard rates since the TOU rates would cause them to have higher bills. Since the TOU consumption of each customer is fixed, the utility must still provide the same amount of electricity in each period as before the offering of the TOU rates; consequently, the utility's costs of production are the same. However, since the customers who chose TOU rates receive lower bills for their consumption, the revenues of the utility decrease. With lower revenues and the same costs, the utility's profits decline.
As stated above, the loss in utility profit need not be borne by the utility's shareholders. If, as in California, rates are adjusted to recoup the lost revenues, then rates rise for all customers. This means that customers who are on the standard rates are hurt, even though they did not change their consumption or choose the TOU rates.
The parties who oppose optional TOU rates are those who have the greatest chance of being harmed. In California, these are customers who expect not to choose TOU rates. Furthermore, and in many ways more importantly, customers in one sector can object to optional TOU rates being offered in other sectors. For example, advocates for residential customers have objected 2 to optional TOU rates in the agricultural sector on the grounds that these rate options serve simply as rate reductions to the agricultural sector, which require that residential customers carry a larger burden for revenue requirements.
. .
Optional TOU rates can reduce utility profits, and hence serve to raise rates generally, under far less extreme.conditions than the example given above. In the example, customers were assumed to have fixed consumption in each time period, such that their consumption levels did not change under TOU prices. Actually, consumers can be price responsive and the same phenomenon occur. That is, optional TOU rates.can decrease utility profits even if consumers are price sensitive. Suppose consumers who choose TOU prices reduce their consumption in the peak in response to the higher peak price. The utility's costs of producing will decline since it does not need to produce as much electricity in the expensive, peak period. However, this cost savings might be less than the loss of revenue that occurs from the customers receiving a lower bill under TOU rates; if the cost reduction is less than the revenues reduction, then profits will fall. . .
Optional TOU rates need not decrease utility profits: it is possible that profits will increase with the offering of optional TOU rates. An example will illustrate this possibility:· Suppose that a group of customers can easily shift a large share of their consumption from the peak to the offpeak. If TOU rates were offered to these customers, they would choose them even if the price difference between peak and off-peak were very small. They would shift their consumption from the peak to the off-peak and, by doing so, obtain a lower energy bill. The utility's costs would drop since it is producing less in the peak and more in the off-peak, and these cost reductions would exceed the slight loss in revenues from these customers. .
Optional TOU rates can therefore increase or decrease utility profits and hence either decrease or increase general rates under regulatory procedures like those in California. Which of these two events occurs depends, as the examples given above indicate, on (i) the extent to which the TOU rates provide a bill reduction for some customers at their current consumption levels, versus, (ii) the extent to which customers are willing and able to shift consumption in response to the TOU prices. If the former effect is larger, then the optional TOU rates will reduce profits; while profits will rise if the latter effect is larger.
An interesting result completes the picture. It has been shown that, in most situations, it is possible to design optional TOU rates that increase profits and hence can result in a general rate reduction (see Mackie-Mason, ·1990, and Train, 1988) . The design of these rates requires information on the marginal costs in each time period and the price responses of customers. However, even without this information, the result shifts the terms of the debate. Instead of discussing whether TOU rates are beneficial or harmful in general, the issue becomes: do particular TOU rates that have been proposed or offered increase or decrease utility profit? And what TOU rates can be offered that will increase utility profits and hence lead to a general rate reduction? These questions are the topiC of our analysis.
III. Customer's Choice between TOU and Standard Rates
In this section we describe the standard economic theory of customer choice between optional rate schedules (Faulhaber and Panzar, 1977; Brown and Sibley, 1986; Train, 1991) . This theory has implications for the appropriate specification of the empirical analysis.
Conside~' first a customer facing standard, non-time-differentiated rates for electridty. The customer obtains value from its consumption of electridty that is greater than the amount that the customer has to pay for the electricity (otherwise the customer would not consume any electridty.) The amount by which value exceeds the amount the customer pays is called the consumer surplus. As depicted in Figure 1 , consumer surplus is the difference between the demand curve (which denotes the customer's willingness to pay) and the price (which is the amount that the customer is required to pay.)
Consider now two time periods, called the peak and the off-peak. The customer's demand in each period is shown in Figure 2 . Under standard prices, which are the same in both period, the .customer obtains surplus equal to the area ACD in the. peak and the area FGK in the offpeak. Under TOU prices, the customer faces a higher price in the peak and lower price in the off-peak. In the peak the consumer obtains surplus equal to area ABE, which is less than the surplus he obtained in the peak under standard prices. The loss in surplus in the peak is the shaded area EBCD. In the off-peak the customer obtains surplus equal to area PHI, which is greater than the surplus he obtained in the off-peak under standard prices. The gain in surplus in the off-peak is the shaded area KGHJ.
In accordance with standard economic concepts, the customer is assumed to choose the rates that provide him with the greater surplus. That is, the customer chooses TOU rates only if the surplus that he obtains under TOU rates exceeds the surplus that he obtains under standard rates. In the context of Figure 2 , the customer chooses TOU rates only if the gain in surplus that arises because of the lower price in the off-peak (ie., the shaded area in the off-peak graph) is greater than the loss in surplus from facing a higher price in the peak (i.e, the shaded area in the peak graph.)
Several implications for the empirical analysis are immediately obvious. First, the demand curves of the customer determine whether he chooses TOU rates. The econometric model that describes the customer's choice between TOU and standard rates should therefore depend on the customer's TOU demand curves. This dependence has been ignored in most previous work on optional TOU rates (Goett, 1988; Caves, et aI., 1989) .
Second, if all customers have the same demand curves in the peak and off-peak, then all customers will make the same choice; that is, either all customers will choose TOU rates or all customers will choose standard rates. Conversely, if some customers choose TOU rates and some choose standard rates, it must be the case that the demand curves for customers differ. This fact has important implications for the specification of the econometric model of electridty demand. Previous analyses of optional TOU rates have utilized models for which the expected demand for all customers with the same characteristics (such as income) were the same. These models imply, therefore, that all customers with the same characteristics will make the same choice between TOU and standard rates, which is inconsistent with observed choices. An econometric model is required that explicitly allows the demand curves for customers to differ. Furthermore, the distribution of demand curves needs to be estimated as well as the average
The relation between customers' demand curves and their choices between TOU and standard rates can be derived, at least qualitatively, from the analysis of Figure- 2. In particular, the following results are obtained:
1. A customer with lower peak demand is more likely to choose TOU rates than a customer with higher peak demand, all else held equal. In Figure 2 , shifting the demand curve in the peak period to the left reduces the loss of consumer surplus (i.e., points B and C move to the left such that area EBCD is smaller). With . less loss, it is more likely that the gain in the off-peak will exceed the loss in the peak.
2. A customer with higher demand in the off-peak is more likely to choose TOU rates than a customer with lower off-peak demand, all else equal. Shifting the demand curve in the off-peak out to the right increases the gain in ~nsumer surplus.
3. A customer with greater price response in the peak is more likely to choose TOU rates than a customer with less price response. In Figure 2 , if the peak demand curve rotates around point C becoming less steep (i.e., point B moves to the left and point C stays the same), then the loss of consumer surplus becomes less. Note that a less steep demand curve represents greater price response.
4. A customer with greater price response in the off-peak is more likely to choose TOU rates than a customer with less price response. In Figure 2 , a less steep demand curve in the off-peak (obtained by moving point H to the right and keeping G at the same place) increases the gain in surplus from TOU rates.
5. A customer with greater ability and willingness to shift consumption from the peak to the off-peak (that is, with greater cross-price response) is more likely to choose TOU rates than a customer who would not shift as readily. This result is not represented in Figure 2 , which implicitly assumes no cross-price responses. However, it is dearly the case that any shifting of demand from the peak to the off-peak increases the gain in surplus in the off-peak and reduces the loss in the peak.
Results 3-5 are particularly important to the issue of whether optional TOU rates increase or decrease the utility's profits. As stated in section il, optional TOU rates necessarily reduce the utility's profits if customers have fixed demands with no price response. However, if customers are price responsive, then optional TOU rates can possibly increase utility profits and hence lead to a general rate reduction. Price responsive customers will, under TOU prices, decrease their consumption in the peak and increase their consumption in the off-peak. The utility benefits since the number of kWhs demanded in the peak period, which are relatively expensive to produce, decreases and the number of kWhs demanded in the off-peak, which are relatively inexpensive to produce, increases. In this regard, the fact that the customers with greater price responses are more likely to choose TOU rates, all else equal, serves to increase the likelihood that optional TOU rates increase utility profits.
The empirical analysis must be designed to estimate the price responses of customers, and to do so in a way that recognizes that customers who chose TOU rates can be expected to have different price responsiveness than those who choose to remain on standard rates. Without this information, it is not possible to determine whether the optional TOU rates increased or decreased the utility's profits.
A critical econometric issue arises because of the fact that customers choose between TOU and standard rates on the basis of their demand curves. Figure 3 illustrates the issue. The figure depicts the peak-period demand curves of two customers who have the same characteristics but different demand in the. peak period. Customer 2 has greater peak-period demand than customer 1. Consistent with result (1) above, suppose that customer 1, whohas the lower peak demand, chooses TOU rates while customer 2, who has greater peak demand, decides to remain on standard rates. The observed data points are therefore points A and B (point A is the demand of customer 1 under TOU rates and point B is the demand of customer 2 under standard rates.) The difference in the consumption of these two customers is QB-QA. Under traditional empirical analysis, this difference would be taken as the estimated price response: the difference in consumption of two customers who are the same except that one faces a higher price than the other. However, this difference in observed consumption is larger than the actual -price response. The actual price response of customer 1 is the movement from point C to point A: the quantity QC-QA.
The problem is that the difference between points B and A is due to two factors, only one of which is the actual price response. The difference between points B and A is comprised of the difference between B and C plus the difference between C and A. The difference between points B and C is the difference in the original demand curves of the two customers; it is this difference that caused customer 2 to choose TOU rates while customer 1 chose standard rates. The difference between points C and A is the price response of customer 1.
To estimate the price response of customers to TOU rates, the empirical analysis must be designed to decompose the observed differences in consumption into these two parts: (i) the difference in consumption that reflects differences in demand curves and leads to different choices between TOU and standard rates, and (ii) the difference in consumption that reflects a response to price by those customers that chose TOU rates. Both parts are required in order to determine the impact of optional TOU rates on the utility's profits.
The econometric model and estimation procedure that we specify (see the Appendix) incorporate the essential features of customers' choice process. In particular, the model: (i) recognizes that the customer's choice between TOU and standard rates depends on the customer's demand curves in the peak and off-peak periods, (ii) recognizes that different customers have different demand curves and estimates the distribution of these demand curves as well as the average demand curve, (iii) in estimating the price responses of customers, accounts for the fact that customers choose the rates they face. The econometric model is used to determine the demand levels and price elasticities of customers who chose TOU rates, customers who chose standard 6 rates, and all. customers combined. The impact of PG&E optional TaU rates on PG&E's profits are calculated from these estimates.
IV. Data
The analysis is conducted on data from a specially designed experiment on optional TOU rates conducted by PG&E. These are the same data that Goett (1988) analyzed; Caves et al. (1989) examined data from an earlier phase of this same experiment. 3 The experiment offered different TOU rates to different customers and observed the TOU consumption of customers who chose the TOU rates as well as a sample of customers who chose to remain on the standard rates. Unlike data from a non-experimental setting, the TOU rates that were offered varied over customers, and the TOU consumption of customers under standard rates is known. Both of these elements enhance the ability of the econometrics to infer the underlying distribution of demand curves. Nevertheless, high correlations among the price variables allow only a restricted distribution of demand curves to be estimated. Further work, including the construction of experiments designed with explicit recognition of the underlying behavioral! econometric model to be estimated, is needed to estimate less restricted, and more realistic, distributions of demand curves.
In 1983, the California Public Utilities Commission ordered PG&E to test the customer acceptance, load impacts, and the cost and revenue implications of optional TOU tariffs. During 1984, PG&E developed an experimental design and recruited residential customers for participation ~. the experiment! In addition to a currently existing TOU tariff (labeled 0-7), seven new TOU tariffs were established (labeled D-8A through D-8G.) The tariffs differed in the peak and off-peak prices that were charged in each block, the thresholds at which rates changed in each period (that is, the definition of the blocks), and the hours that were labeled as peak and off-peak. The characteristics of the tariffs are given in Table 1 .
Residential customers whose consumption during the previous twelve months exceeded 800 kWh per month were targeted for recruitment. A random sample of this population was draWn in each geographical region, and sampled customers were offered one of the TOU tariffs. All customers who chose to switch to the TOU tariff were included in the experiment, as well as a random sample of customers who chose not to switch. Meters were installed on all customers in the experiment, beginning sometime around early 1985 (the date of meter installation varied over customers.) During 1985, all customers were billed under the standard, non-TOU rate (labeled D-1), though the TOU consumption of each customer was recorded. In early 1986, approximately half of the customers who had volunteered for the TOU tariff were switched to the TOU tariff that had been offered to them; the other half were continued on the standard rates. The selection of customers into these two groups was random. All customers' TOU consumption was recorded through the end of 1986.
In short, the experimental design consists of approximately two years of TOU consumption data for each of three groups of customers: (A) customers who chose for the TOU tariff and were charged under standard rates in 1985 and under TOU rates in 1986, (B) customers who chose the TOU tariff but were charged under the standard tariff for the entire two-year period, and (C) customers who chose the standard tariff and were charged standard rates for both years. The design allows comparison of: (1) pre-versus post-treatment consumption of customers who chose TOU rates (group A in 1985 compared to 1986), (2) pre-treatment consumption of customers who chose TOU tariffs versus that of customers who chose standard rates (1985 for groups A and B compared to group C), (3) consumption of customers who chose TOU rates versus that of customers who chose standard rates (1986 for group A compared to group C), and (4) consumption of customers who chose rou rates and were placed on TOU rates versus consumption of customers who chose TOU rates but were placed on standard rates (1986 for group A compared to group B.) . .
The distinctions among these comparisons is evident iIi reference to Figure 3 . The first and fourth comparisons provide estimates of the quantity QC-QA, which is the price response of customers who chose TOU rates. The second comparison gives an estimate of the quantity QB-QA, which is the difference in the consumption of customers who chose TOU rates and those who chose standard rates when both sets of customers are under standard rates. This difference arises because, as stated above, customers with lower peak period demand and higher off-peak demand are more likely to choose TOU rates. The third comparison gives a measure of the quantity QB-QA and serves as a check on the other comparisons (since quantity QB-QA equals the sum of quantities QB-QC and QC -QA.) Table 2 gives the total number of eligible customers and the number included in the analysis. The first row reports the number of customers who were offered an optional TOU rate (36,742 customers) and the number who chose to switch to the TOU rate (4,081). For the estimated demand curves to be meaningful, the same definition of the peak period is required for all customers (or, alternatively, the demand parameters must be explicitly represented as functions of the definition of the peak, an approach which we did not attempt.) Schedules 0-7, 0-8C, 0, E, and G impose the same definition of the peak, while the other schedules use different definitions. We eliminated from analysis all customers who were offered schedules 0-8A, B, and F. s The second row of Table 2 reports the number of customers who were offered one of the five TOU rates that had consistent definition of the peak (31,727 customers) and the number of these customers who chose the TOU rates (3,532). Not all customers who were offered TOU rates were included in the experiement (that is, not all customers had TOU meters installed on their residences). All customers who chose TOU rate were potentially included; however, some of these customers did not participate because they moved away, a TOU meter could not be installed, or for other reasons. Of the customers who did not choose TOU rates, a random sample of about one-in-ten was drawn, and TOU meters were installed on these huseholds when possible. The third row of Table 2 gives the number of customers who were offered one of the five installed. That is, the third row gives the number of customers who were included in our analysis. The final row reports the sampling proportions for these customers (with the method of calculating these proportions given in the footnote to the table).
V. Estimation
The technical appendix gives details of the econometric model and its estimation. As suggested by the analysis of section IT, the customer is assumed to have demand curves in the peak and off-peak periods. Different customers have different demand curves, such that there is a distribution of demand curves in the population. Each customer chooses TOU'rates if, given his demand curves, he would obtain greater consumer surplus under TOU rates than under standard rates. Therefore, the choice between TOU and standard rates depends on the customer's demand curve. Some customers choose TOU rates while others choose standard rates because different customers have different demand curves.
The demand curves provide all the information that is used to determine a customer's TOU consumption and his choice between TOU and standard rates. The demand curves of each customer is assumed to be linear, with a y-intercept and a slope for the customer's peak period demand curve and a separate y-intercept and slope for his off-peak demand curves. The yintercept denotes the level of demand, while the slope denotes the price responsiveness of the customer. Different customers have different demand curves; consequently, there is a distribution of y-intercepts and slopes for the peak and off-peak demand curves. We estimate the average and variance of the distribution of the y-intercepts and slopes. For example, the yintercept of the peak period demand curve for a particular customer denotes the level of this customer's peak period demand; the average and variance of this y-intercept across customers is estimated. Similarly, the slope of the peak demand curve denotes the price responSiveness of the customer; the average and variance over customers of this slope is estimated. And similarly for the y-intercept and slope of the off-peak demand curves. Table 3 gives estimates of the distribution of demand curves. Three models are presented, with the estimates for the models given in the three columns. The models differ in the extent to which demand curves are estimated to vary over customers. These differences are discussed in the next paragraph. -'jConsider first the similarities among the models. In all three models, the average y-intercept, 'for both the peak and off-peak demand, is specified to depend on a variety of factors, including the weather and number of members in the household. For example, a cooling degree day variable 6 enters the peak demand equations with a positive sign (11.83 in all three models). This result reflects the fact that the average level of peak period demand is higher in hot monthS, when air conditioners are used extensively, than in more mild months. Similarly, households with more members have, on average, a higher level of demand than households with fewer members. The components of the average y-intercepts are given in the 6Cooling degree days is the amount by which averilge temperature exceeds 65 degrees in each day. summed over all the days in the month. When the ilverage temperature is below 65 degrees. the value ior that day is zero. top part of Table 3 . The estimates all take the expected signs and are fairly similar in all three models.
The average slopes for the peak and off-peak demand curves are also estimated in all three models. These estimates are given in the part of the table labeled "Price coefficients of demand." For example, the average slope of the peak period demand curves is estimated in the first model to be -186.0. This estimate means that if the price in the peak period is raised by one cent (and the off-peak price is held constant), then consumption in the peak period will decrease, on average, by 1.86 kWh per month per customer. (Note that price is denoted in dollars, such that a one cent change is a 1/100 th change in the price variable.) The average slope in the off-peak is -1617.1. for the first model, meaning that a one cent price rise decreases off-peak consumption by -16.171 kWh per month per customer, on average. The average slope for off-peak demand is considerably higher than that for the peak demand because the off-peak period is considerably longer than the peak (18 hours versus 6 hours-not given in the table) and average consumption in the off-peak is greater than that in the peak (893 kWh/month versus 184_ kWh/month-also not given in the table). Elasticities of demand, which measure price responsiveness in a way that normalizes for differences in level of consumption are discussed below. The estimate labeled "cross-price" in Table 3 gives the average slope of the peak period demand curve with respect to the off-peak price, and vice-versa. This figure denotes the extent to which customers shift consumption from the off-peak to the peak when the off-peak price rises (and the opposite: the extent to which customers shift from the peak to the off-peak when the peak price rises.) The positive sign of this average slope indicates, as expected, that peak demand increases when the off-peak price rises (with the peak price held constant.) This result is consistent with the finding of Hausman and Trimble (1984) that peak and off-peak electricity consumption are substitutes.
The three models in Table 3 differ in the extent to which the variances of the y-intercepts and slopes of the demand curves are estimated. In column 1, the y-intercepts of peak and off-peak demand vary over customers due to unobserved factors but the slopes are constant (that is, variances are estimated for the y-intercepts but not the slopes.) In column 2, the slopes vary over customers but the y-intercepts vary only with observed factors (that is, the variances of the slopes are estimated but not of the y-intercepts.) In column 3, the y-intercepts for peak and offpeak demand and the slope of peak demand vary due to unobserved factors <that is, variances are estimated for the y-intercepts and for the slope of the peak demand curves, but not for the slope of the off-peak demand curves.)7 The estimated variances are all positive, as required for variances.
The estimates for model 3 (i.e., the model with the most complete set of estimated variances) imply average price elasticities of -0.09 in the peak and -0.20 in the off-peak. These elasticities represent short-run response, with the customer's appliance holdings and housing characteristics held constant. Goett estimated average elasticities of -0.16 and -0.35 in the peak and off-peak. His estimates are slightly higher than ours. However, his specification does not reflect the bidirectionality of causation (by which customers choose between the two rate schedules based on their demand curves and then, given their chosen rate schedule, respond to the prices under the schedule.) Consequently, Goett's estimates can be expected to capture some of the effect of 7. Due-to the high correlation among variables, the variance in the slope oi the off-peak demand curves cannot be estimated_ demand on choice of rate schedule (i.e., amount QB-QC in Figure 3) rather than simply the effect of prices on demand (amount QC_QA).8
VI. Impacts of PG&E's Optional TOU Rates
The estimated model is used to determine the impacts of the optional TOU rates that PG&E offered under its TOU experiment. Table 4 contains the results. Recall that PG&E designed several TOU rate schedules and offered each schedule to a different group of customers. We restricted out analysis to the five schedules that used the same definition for the peak period, namely, noon to 6 p.m. on weekdays. Each column in Table 4 gives results for the customers who were offered each rate schedule. For example, the first column indicates that 11.3% of the customers who were offered TOU schedule 07 chose to be on the schedule. Of those customers who chose this TOU schedule, the model predicts that their consumption in the peak would be 187.8 kWh per month, on average, if they faced the standard rates. (Note that this is the amount that they are predicted to consume under standard rates even though they faced TOU rates.) The model predicts an average peak period consumption of 206.2 kWh/month for customers who chose not to switch from standard rates to the 07 TOU rates. Other figures in the table are interpreted analogously.
The estimated consumption levels and elastidties given in parts I and II of the table are used to compare customers who chose TOU rates with those who chose standard rates. For all five optional TOU rate schedules, the model indicates that customers who chose TOU rates would have lower peak consumption than customers who chose standard rates, if both groups of customers faced standard rates. This result is expected since customers with a lower ratio of peak to off-peak consumption under standard rates obtain a greater bill reduction by switching to TOU rates. Customers who chose TOU rates are found to have, on average, more elastic demand in the peak and less elastic demand in the off-peak. This result is consistent with the findings of Goett (1988) . The higher peak elasticity is intuitive: customers who are more able and willing to reduce consumption in the peak are more likely to choose TOU rates. The lower off-peak elastidty is theoretically possible but not as intuitive. With all other factors (such as consumption levels) held constant, customers who are more price responsive are expected to choose TOU rates more readily since they can benefit more from the lower off-peak price. However, all other factors are not held constant in the population of all customers; in particular, the level of off-peak consumption is higher for customers who chose TOU rates than those who chose standard rates. With larger off-peak consumption, the average off-peak elasticity can be smaller for customers who chose TOU rates compared to those who chose standard rates, because, with a higher level of off-peak consumption, the percent change in consumption is smaller even though the absolute change is larger.
Part III of the table gives estimates of the impact of the TOU rates on the customers who chose them, as well as the resulting impacts on the utility. Before discussing these results, it is important to note that the TOU rates that PG&E offered were designed for the purpose of generating data that could be used to estimate models of TOU demand. The rates were not designed to increase surplus or profits. Our analysis of the impacts of these rates is intended simply to serve as an example of how the model can be used to evaluate optional TOU rates and to illustrate the potential impacts of TOU rate offerings.
As expected, customers who chose TOU rates are forecast to decrease their consumption in the peak and increase their consumption in the off-peak in response to TOU prices. These estimated changes are the price response only (i.e., quantity QC -QA in Figure 3) , aft~r netting out the differences in demand that cause the customers to choose TOU rates (quantity QB -QC). This latter quantity is the difference in estimated consumption under standard rates, which is given in Part I of the table. For schedule 07, the quantity QB -QC in the peak is 187.8 -206.2 = -18.4.
Comparing this figure with the price response of -18.03 indicates that, for this schedule, about half of the observed difference in peak consumption between customers who chose TOU rates and those who chose standard rates is due to price response; the other half is the difference in demand that induced the customers to choose TOU or standard rates.
Under all five TOU schedules, customers are found to increase their off-peak consumption more, in absolute terms, than they decrease their peak consumption. However, since off-peak consumption levels are greater than peak consumption levels, peak consumption decreases by a greater percentage than off-peak consumption increases. Under three of the TOU rate schedules customers who chose· TOU rates receive smaller bills, on average, under TOU rates than they would have received under standard rates. For the other two schedules, customers increase their off-peak consumption sufficiently that their average bills actually increase under TOU rates.
The change in utility costs is calculated by multiplying the change in peak and off-peak consumption by the marginal cost of production in each period. The California Public Utilities Commission has approved TOU marginal cost figures for PG&E.9 The relevant figures are 0.11684 and 0.05644 dollars per kWh in the peak and off-peak, respectively, for summer months, and 0.05913 and 0.05120 for peak and off-peak in the winter. Using these figures, the utility's costs are calculated to have risen as a result of the optional TOU rates. That is, the extra cost associated with the additional off-peak consumption is greater than the cost savings from the reduction in peak consumption.
The change in profits is the change in the customer's bill (which is utility revenue) minus the change in costs. Note, of course, that this change in profit is not actually retained or borne by the utility, but is (at least partially) passed onto consumers. For all five TOU schedules, the utility's profits are predicted to have declined, which means that, under California's regulatory procedures, the optional TOU rates contributed to a general rate increase. As stated above, this result does not mean that the TOU rates were poorly designed, since the objective in designing them was not to increase profits or decrease rates but rather to generate useful data. Nevertheless, the result indicates the potential danger of optional TOU rates to customers who must bear any lost profits through higher rates.
As discussed in Section n, optional TOU rates can be designed that increase utility profits and hence lead to a general rate reduction. The estimated model is a tool for the design of such TOU rate schedules. In fact, this is the primary purpose of the model.
Vll. Further Work
As demonstrated in the previous section, the estimated model is capable of forecasting the impacts of optional TOU rates. It is recommended that utilities use this model, or a model like it, to evaluate TOU rate schedules before the rates are offered and to design optional TOU schedules that increase surplus and profits. In future research, we plan to calculate optimal optional TOU rates, that is, the rates that provide the greatest increase in surplus. These optimal rates can be determined under the constraint that the utility's profits not decrease. Consumer surplus and utility profits under standard rates, mandatory TOU rates, and the optimal optional TOU rates can be compared.
Other avenues for future research involve the specification and estimation of the model. Estimation methods are required that allow estimation of the entire model Simultaneously. Simulation procedures for estimation are a promising possibility. The specification can be generalized in several ways to represent more accurately customers' choice process. The most prominent potential generalizations involve: (i) adding income effects, (ii) allowing more flexible cross-price effects, (iii) allowing additional factors (representing, for example, inertia, transaction costs, or altruistic concern about the environment) to enter the choice of tariff that do not enter the demand equations (as in Train, 1990) , and (iv) capturing the learning process of customers, by which customers learn about their TOU demand and price responses by being under a TOU tariff. These generalizations will add to the complexity of the estimation and hence will need to be undertaken in conjunction with the development of improved estimation methods.
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A.I Specification TECHNICAL APPENDIX Econometric Model of Customers' TOU Demand and Choice between TOU and Standard Rates Electricity is usually charged in blocks. In the PG&E experiment, the TOU and standard tariffs both consisted of inverted blocks. We adopt the approach developed by Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Hausman (1985) for nonlinear prices: the customer is considered to face a marginal price which is the rate in the block in which the customer consumes and to have "virtual income" which is the customer's income plus the difference between the marginal price and intramarginal price for each lower block times the length of the block.1 Let Ppm and P om be the. peak and off-peak marginal prices faced by the customer in month m and let VY m be the virtual income of the customer in month m. Prices and virtual income vary over months because the customer's consumption level varies (putting the customer in different blocks) and the thresholds and rates under a given tariff are different in different seasons. For reasons to be described later, we assume a Gorman indirect utility function: By Roy's identity, the peak and off-peak demand functions are:
pm pm ppm om x = a + f3 P + 8P . pm pm pm where apm and aom are linear-in-parameters functions of observed variables where the variables lFor example, if the tariff is 7c per kwh for up to 500 kwh's and 11k beyond and the customer consumes in the second block, then the marginal price is toe and virtual income is the customer's income plus 515 (3c/kwh times SOli kwh's), which is the "discount" the customer rt>\:eives from the lower first block price. may vary over m but the parameters do not. The vector fl = (1'11,1'12,1'13,1'14,1'15 ) varies over customers with distribution N(O,W) where W has elements denoted ~)1 ~2' etc. The vector Pm = (Ppm' p om ) is independent of fl and uncorrelated over m.
To facilitate interpretation, consider the y-intercept of the peak demand function: <lpm. The average y-intercept for customers with the same observed variables is upm in month m. Each customer's actual y-intercept differs from the average. This difference consists of a component 'I'll that is constant over months, and a part J.lpm that varies over months and represents factors that reveal themselves to the customer on a month-ta-month basis (such as whether the customer takes a trip). The customer knows 1h and learns J.lpm when month m arrives; the. researcher observes neither 1' 11, nor Ppm. The other demand parameters are interpreted analogously.
The customer chooses TOU rates if its expected utility over the course of a year is greater under TOU than standard rates.
2 Let rm and VY! denote the marginal price and virtual income in month m that the customer would face under the standard tariff; and let sm' t.n, and VY! be the marginal peak and off-peak prices and virtual income in month m under the TOU tariff. Total expected utility under each tariff is:l
The customer calculates TEUTand TEUS exactly and chooses TOU rates only if TEU T > TEUS.
The researcher, however, does not observe fl and hence ascribes a probability that the customer chooses the TOU tariff:
:Under PG&E's experiment, the TOU rates lasted one year and customers could not switch to TOU riltes ilfter initially choosing standard rates. Customers were allowed to drop out of the experiment, in which Cilse a customer on TOU rates would return to standard rates. In fact, however, most of the customers who dropped out did so because they moved. In non-experimental applications, customers can switch between rates; however, due to psychic and actual transaction costs, customers can be expected to use some horizon larger than il month for evaluilting tariifs.
3(j) The customer does not observe Pm prior to month m and utilizes its expectation, which is zero. (ii) The customer would utilize expected, or "normal", weather in the calculation of COD. For there PC&E data, estimated parameters are essentially the same whether actual or normill weather is used. (iii) The customer might apply il time discount. However, in the PG&E experiment, the customer did not know when the TOU rates would start and hence could not determine when·to·start the discounting.
The left hand side of the inequality is observed by the researcher; denote it as SYS. The right hand side, labeled -ERR, is not observed by the researcher but is known to be distributed normal with zero mean and variance VAR = kWk' where the 1x5 vector k has elements 1:(Sm-r m ), 1:(tmr m ), 2. ~ (S2 -r2), 2. ~ (t 2 -r2), ~ (s t -r2) with the summations over m=l, ... , 12 (such that ERR=i'\k'). Consequently, pT =<I'( ~~'!) ,·which is a probit model whose argument is nonlinear in parameters.
If the customer chooses TOU rates, its peak consumption in month m is:
The customer knows all of these terms when month m arrives and calculates its demand exactly. The researcher, however, does not observe 1111 1131 1151 or Jlpm. Furthermore,' whlle these terms have zero mean in the entire population, they do not have zero mean in the sub-population of customers who chose TOU rates. More fundamentally, the fact that the customer chose TOU rates reveals information to the researcher about the customer's actual parameters. Using Heckman's (1979) general result, we know that:
where COY;,. is the covariance of 111 + 11 3 s m + 115tm +J1pm with ERR in the probit model. This covariance is linear in parameters, with variables that are functions of prices and coefficients that are elements of W. For example, if W is diagonal (ie, no covariances), then: 12 1 12 12 COV T =-00 ~(s -r)-oo S _~(s2-r2)-oo t ~(st _r2). n n 55 mL n n n n·1 n.1 n=1
The peak demand equation becomes: To aid interpretation, consider, for example, the case in which only COt1 is non-zero in W. That is, all customers have the same price coefficients and y-intercepts for off-peak demand and differ only in their y-intercepts for peak demand. The peak demand equation becomes:
if customer chose TOU tariff if customer chose standard tariff.
A customer who chose TOU rates consumes less in the peak than a customer who chose standard rates., for two reasons. First, the peak price is higher under TOU rates than standard rates. The response to the higher price is captured by ~p which is presumably negative. Second, 4Note that the customer reveals information about its 1' \ when choosing a tariff, but not about Pm' At the time of choosing between tilriffs, the customer is ilssumed not to know Pm' which is reveilled to the customer only when month m ilrrives. COV m depends therefore on elements of W but not on the distribution of Pm' The remilini~g error term I:rm T incorporiltes Ill"" entirely plus the reseilrcher's remilining uncertilinty ilbollt TIl' TI" and TI~.
the customer chose TOU rates because its peak consumption was lower. This latter effect is captured in the last term before the error. K T , KS, E(sn-rn)' and ron are necessarily positive, such that a positive amount is being subtracted in the function for the customer who chose TOU rates and a different positive amount added for a customer who chose standard rates. The ability of the model to differentiate these two directions of causation is one of its important features.
Consider now the specification of the indirect utility function. The Gorman form gives linear demand equations with no income effect. There are three interrelated reasons for this specification.
(1) We interpret the demand equations as applicable only within the range of price . . differences across tariffs, in which case linearity can be considered a first order approximation.
(2) The model is intended primarily to provide information on the distribution of demand parameters for a population with given (fixed) characteristics, including income. As such the model is a short-run forecasting tool for use in designing tariffs for the population on which it is estimated. Households with greater income may consume more electricity and have different price responses than lower income families. These differences are captured, however, in these households' individual parameters, through higher a's and different B's. With the demand equations seen as applicable only within the relevant range of electricity prices, the inclusion of no income effect actually implies that the addition to virtual income that a tariff provides does not affect the customer's consumption. This assumption is not unreasonable, given the negligible size of this addition compared to total income. (3) The model places relatively few informational requirements on the customer. The parameters of linear demand correspond to information that the customer can intuitively consider, namely, the magnitude of demand in each period and the amount that the customer expects to respond to a unit change in price.
A.2 Estimation
Marginal prices and virtual income under the block rate tariffs are determined through an instrumental variables approach similar to that proposed by Rosen (1976) and Hausman, Kinnucan, and Mcfadden (1979) . A regresSion model of TOU consumption is estimated that includes exogenous variables only. This model is used to predict each month's TOU consumption for each customer. Under each tariff (the standard tariff and the TOU tariff that the customer was offered), the block in which this predicted consumption falls is identified. The marginal price and virtual income associated with this block is used as the instrument for price and virtual· income for that customer in that month under that tariff. For the purpose of calculating these marginal prices and virtual income, we use the regresSions of TOU consumption that were performed by Goett on these data and reported in his Appendix B.
The model can conceivably be estimated by full information maximum likelihood. However, the highly nonlinear form of the model and the high correlations among variables make MLE unstable. We instead chose a sequential estimation approach that exploits the robustness of linear regreSSion and hence can perhaps be expected to produce better estimates in finite samples. The procedure consists of the following steps. First, the probit model of tariff choice is estimated using ML on the data relating to this choice alone. The estimated parameters are used to calculate a consistent estimate of K. Using the estimated K, the demand equations are estimated by least squares. Note that, given K, the demand equations are linear in parameters, with all parameters in the complete model identified.
The empirical analysis is hindered by the fact that the TOU tariffs were designed such that, for each tariff, the "average price" in the peak is 2.5 times that in the off-peak, where average price in each period is defined as the total revenues that PG&E would obtain for consumption in that period if all customers were charged under the TOU tariff, divided by the total kWh's that would be consumed in the period (with this latter figure calculated on the basis of some assumptions about the TOU consumption of customers; for details, see PG&E, 1985.) Marginal prices in the peak and off-peak are not perfectly correlated under the TOU tariffs because of the block rate nature of the tariffs: different customers consumer in different blocks such that the ratio of marginal prices for each customer is not 2.5. However, the amount of independent variation in peak and off-peak prices is severely limited by this· aspect of the experimental design.
In the probit model of tariff choice, the limitation is most severely felt in the estimation of elements of VAR, which is a linear combination of elements of W, the variance/co-variance matrix for the parameters. Convergence was achieved only when all elements of W except ffiJl are restricted to zero. Strictly speaking, this specification is equivalent to assuming that the yintercept of peak demand varies over customers but the price coefficients anc:!.,.the y-intercept of off-peak demand do not. We interpret the model more generally, however. Recall that the purpose of the estimation of the probit model is to obtain a consistent estimate of K Given the high correlation among variables that enter V AR, using only those that interact with ffiJl is likely to capture nearly all the variation in K that would occur with an unrestricted W. Table 5 gives the estimated parameters of the probit model. The demand regresSiOns are presented and discussed in Section V. Tier lengths depend on the customer's lOcation and whether or not the customer is "all electric." Different tier lengths apply in summer and winter.
·Peak and off-peak consumption are combined to determine whether the Tier 1 price is charged (Le., the Tier 1 threshold is based on total kWh in peak and off-peak).
"·O-SG contains three tiers in each period. proportional to the inverse of the sampling frequency among customers who chose each tariff.
"These customers ronsist of those placed on TOU in 1986 and those who were required to remain on standard rates in 1986. That is, these customers consist of groups A and B as described in the text.
"These customers consist of group C as described in the text. Log likelihood at amYergeDce -748.228
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Weighted number of households choosing TOU • Each variable is divided by L (sm -rm) I which is the observed portion of VAR'/~ . 
